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Thispaper develops ananalyticalframework for studying colonial investment from the
perspectiveof neoclassical political economy. The distinguishing feature of colonial investment
in this model is that the metropolitan government restricts the amount of investment in the colony
in order to maximize the net profits earned in the colony. The model explicitly includes the
threat of extralegal appropriative activities by the indigenous population in the colony.
The analysis of this model identifies the conditions, where these conditions include both
the technology of production and the technology of extralegal appropriation, that determine the
profitability of colonialism. The analysis suggests why historically some countries but not others
became colonies and why many colonies that were initially profitable subsequently become
unprofitable and were abandoned. The model also has implications for the amount of investment.
the allocation of resources between productive and appropriative activities, and the distribution
of income in colonies.
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and NBERThis paper develops an analytical framework for studying colonial investment from
the perspective of neoclassical political economy. The analysis focuses on instances of colo-
nialism, perhaps best exemplified by modern European and Japanese colonialism in parts
of Asia, in which, as suggested by Peter Svedberg (1981, 1982), the primary motivation
for establishing colonies was the monopolization of investment. In the analysis metropoli-
tan countries export capital to colonies in order to work with indigenous labor, but each
metropolitan government limits the opportunity to invest in its colonies to its own citizens,
or perhaps to a politically favored subset of its citizens, and, more importantly, restricts
the amount of investment in each colony in order to maximize the net profits earned in
the colony.' These rc3trictions distinguish colonial investment from generic international
investment. Svedberg (1981) describes how these restrictions on investment actually were
enforced in modem European and Japanese colonies.'
An important innovation in this paper is the explicit indusion of the threat of extrale-
gal appropriative activity in a colony. We model extralegal appropriation as an attempt
by elements of the indigenous population, who engage in activities like banditry, to steal
the profit income of the colonial firms.3
The central objective of the analysis is to discover the conditions, where these con-
ditions include both the technology of production and the technology of extralegal appro-
priation, that determine the profitability of colonial investment. We want especially to
'The analysis abstracts from indigenous natural resources. Hence, it does not address instances of colo-
nialism in which metropolitan countries exported either capital or labor in order to exploit natural resources
in their colonies.
'Svedberg (1982) finds that from 1938 to 1957 the rate of return to British investment was significantly
higher in British colonies than in other LDC's. Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback (1988) find that from
1860 to 1880 the rate of return to British investment was higher in British colonies than in Great Britain
itself, but that this difference did not persist from 1880 to 1914. The literature on colonialism also discusses
possible monopolisation otcolonial trade, but Svedberg (1981) finds that the metropolitan countries' shares
of foreign direct investment in their colonies were markedly higher than their shares in trade" (p. 25). In
any event, extending our analysis to allow for colonial trade as well as investment would not change the
main results. -
5Analternative would be to model extralegal appropriation as an attempt by the indigenous population,
possibly in the form of an independence movement, to expropriate the capital of the colonial firms. The
main results of the analysis would obtain in this alternative framework as well.
1determine why historically some countries but not others became colonies and whymany
colonies that initially were profitable subsequently became unprofitable and were aban-
doned. A further objective is to understand the amount of investment, the allocation of
resources between production and appropriative activities, and the distribution of income
in colonies.4
Colonial Firms
In this model there are two countries: a metropolis and a potential or actual colony.
The essential actors in the model are the metropolitan government, the metropolitan
capitalists whose firms invest in the colony, and the indigenous colonial population. The
metropolitan government licenses K firms to invest in the colony, K ￿ 0. Each colonial
firm invests one unit of capital. Other capital imports into the colonyare prohibited.
(Capital can include some human capital necessary to manage the physical capital.)
Once capital is in place in the colony, it cannot be removed and it does not depreciate.
Thus, disinvestment is not possible and capital in place has no alternative cost. Extending
the analysis to consider both depreciation as well as possible repatriation ofcapital would
be conceptually straightforward. The colonial firms hire indigenous labor forwages in a
competitive labor market.5
Output per colonial firm is h°, 0 ca< 1, where It is units of labor time employed
by each firm. Given this technolovr, gross profits of each colonial finn are
IT=h°—wh (1)
where wisthe wage rate per unit of labor time. Each firm takes thewage rate as given
1a thisrespectthe preser.t model adds to the growing literature on general equilibrium models ofresource
allocation and income distribution with both productive and appropriative activities.See, for example,
Grossman (1991) and Grossman (1994), which also provide additional references.
'In practice, colonial firms, with the support of the metropolitangovernment, sometimes also monop-
sonized the labor market. The analysis with a noncompetitive labor market would bemart complex, but
our main conclusion would not change.
2and selects h to maximize r. This maximization implies that Ft satisfies
= . (2)
The average indigenous worker family supplies L units ofwage labor time. There
are N indigenous worker families. Thus, the market-clearing condition for the labor
market is
Kh=NL. (3)





andthat the resulting gross profits of each colonial firm are
NL
(5)
Equations (4) and (5) show that the wage share of output is a and that the profit share
of output is 1 —a.Total gross profits of the colonial sector are
Kn=(l—a)Y, (6)
where Y =KI_0(NL)ais the total output in the colonial sector.
The colonial firms also face the threat of extralegal appropriative activities. Let
f3, 0 ￿ 1, represent the fraction of the profits that colonial firms lose to extralegal
appropriation. Then, the profits of the colonial sector net of extralegal appropriation are
given by
(l—f3)Kir=(1—i9)(1—a)Y (7)
A natural assumption is that, for [3 c1,/3is an increasing function of
where B is the amount of time that the average indigenous family allocates to extralegal
appropriation and, hence, /isthe total time that indigenous families allocate to
3extralegal appropriation per colonial firm. A simple technology of extraiegal appropriation




where￿ 0. In equation (8), the parameter determines the effectiveness of time
allocated to extralegal appropriative activities. As long as /3 is less than unity, the larger
is # the larger is both the average and marginal effect ofon /3.
Indigenous Labor
The indigenous families divide their time among working for wages in the colonial
sector, sell employment in an indigenous sector, or engaging in extralegal appropriation.
Specifically, each indigenous family is endowed with one unit of time of which it allocates
the fraction 1, 0 ￿ £ ￿ 1, to wage employment, the fraction f, 0 ￿ f C1,to self
employment, and the fraction 5, 0S <1,to extralegal appropriative activities. In
equilibrium, because all indigenous families are identical, the vector (t, f, 5) will be the
same for all indigenous families as the vector (L, F, B), where L, F, and B represent the
amount of time that the average family allocates to wage employment, to self employment,
and to extralegal appropriate activities, respectively.
The return from self-employment is f°. (The assumption that the elasticity of the
marginal product of labor equals a in both the colonial sector and the indigenous sector
is a convenient simplification.) The returns from extralegal appropriationsare divided
among the indigenous worker families proportionately to time allocated by each family
to appropriative activities. Accordingly, an individual family's income fromextralegal
appropriation is jit}, which, from equation (8), is equivalent, for /3 <1,to 7rb.
Each indigenous family takes toand0 as given and selects 1,1, and 5, subject
to the constraint 1+1 -i-b =1,to maximize its income, i. The above assumptions imply
4that
i =w+f°+ç6irji. (9)
Given equation (9), the marginal returns to time allocated towage employment1 self em-
ployment and appropriation are to, ala_I, and 7r, respectively.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this maximization problem imply







According to equations (10) -(12),indigenous families allocate time to self employment
either until the marginal return to self employment equals the marginal return towage
employment or the marginal return to extralegal appropriation, whichever is greater, or
until all time is allocated to self employment. Moreover, if either wage employment or
extralegal appropriative activities has a higher marginal rate of return, then indigenous
families allocate all of their remaining time to that activity. Indigenous families allocate
time to both wage employment and extralegal appropriation only if the marginal returns
to these activities are equal.
From equations (10) -(12),which describe the behavior of each individual indigenous
family, we can infer the behavior of the average indigenous family. Equations (10) -(12)
imply that, if to >q5ir,then £ =I—f,f =(.)it,and 6 =0.Equations (10) -(12)
also implythat,if w =7r,then £< 1—f, f =)it, and 6 =1—f--f?0. (We
can ignore the possibility of w <Øirbecause this inequality would imply £ =0,but
would be inconsistent with L =0.)
5Then, replacing(t,f,b)by(L,F,B)in equations (10) -(12),defining a variable
9 andusing equations (4) and(5)for w and 2r,wesee that the behavior of the
average indigenous family fails into one of three cases depending on the value of K
I)Jf >-3pthen we have w>Øandwe have L= i4w' F= = and
11=0. Notethat,if a>G, thencasetappliesforail K￿O. Incase!, Liz
increasing concave function of ,Fis a decreasing convex function of ,and
B equals zero and is independent of .Moreover,B =0implies /3 =0.In
case I, the wage rate is high enough relative to the marginal return to time allocated
to extralegal appropriation that indigenous families choose to allocate no time to
extralegal appropriation.
II)If fjj￿ >¶9,thenwehave w=ç5ir andwehave L='j1, F=
and B =1—!$L =1—ij1s_K$. In case II, L is an increasing linear
function of ,Fis independent of ,andB is a decreasing linear function of .Thevalue of B •in case H is such that 0 </3 C1.Note that case II, as well
as case Ill, can apply only if 9 ￿ a. Let K, which equals 0-_°N, denote the
value of K that, with 9> a, is just large enough to induce the indigenous families
to choose B =0.Note that K is a decreasing function of a and an increasing
function of 9.
III) If ¶9?.>0, then we have w=Ø and we have L=(+', F=
(1 + andB =iaL.In case III, L is an increasing convex function ofF
is a decreasing convex function of ,andB is an increasing convex function of
Moreover, the value of B is such that /3 =1.In case III, the wage rate is sufficiently
low relative to the marginal return to time allocated to extralegal appropriation that
indigenous families allocate enough time to extralegal appropriation to appropriate
all profits.
6The Decision to Create a Colony
Let At denote the profits of the coloniai sector net of extralegalappropriation and
net of the opportunity cost of capital, rK. Thus,
Mr(1—f3)Kir_rK, (13)
where (1 —j3)K7ris given by equation (7). The metropolitan government chooses the
number of firms, K, to license to invest in the colony in order to maximize M. The
constraints on this maximization are the technology of extralegal appropriation,given by
equation (8), and the behavior of the average indigenous family in the three cases described
above. Let K represent the value of K the maximizes M.
Consider first a situation of a > 9. With a > 9, as noted above, case I for the
behavior of the average indigenous family applies for all K ￿ 0. in thiscase, we have




where L = Fromequation (14), we calculate




Equations (15) and (16) show that, with a > 9, M is a concave function of K.
Moreover, if 1— a Cr, then this function is decreasing in K, but, if 1—a > r, then this
function has an interior maximum at which=0and K is positive. Let K denote
the value of K at this interior maximum if it exists. With a > 9, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for the maximization of M imply that, if 1— a <r, then K =0,whereas, if
1 —a> r, then K = 0.In addition, equation (15) implies that K is a decreasing
function of a and r, but that K increases proportionately with N.Consider next the alternative situation of 9 ￿ a. With 9 ? a, as noted above,
cases I, II or III for the behavior of the average indigenous family can apply. In case III,
which applies if 9 > 0, we have 3 =1,and equation (13) becomes
Al =—rK. (17)
From equation (17), we calculate
dM—=-r. (18)
Equation (18) implies that, with 9 ￿ a, over the range ¶Z> 0, Al is a decreasing
function of K.
In case II, which applies if 7K￿ K￿ ç$N, we have L = andB =
— iia_K,and equation (13) becomes
(19)
Recall that K = isthe value of K just large enough, with 0 > a, to induce
B =0.From equation (19), we calculate
dlt'l1—9 a r 20 i—a
Equations (19) and (20) imply that, with 9a, if (1 —a)(1-j1j---)> r, then over
the range K > K > $N, M is an increasing function of K and M is positive at
K=K.
In case I, which applies if K > 1K,equations(14), (15), and (16) are relevant.
Equation (15) implies that, with 9 ￿ a, in the limit as K approaches 7K,Alis an
increasing or decreasing function of K —thatis, the interior maximum k, if it exists,
is larger or smaller than 7K— as(1jl12)0[i —a(2
— islarger or smaller than
Taking cases 1, II, and HI together, with 9 ? a, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
the maximization of M imply the following:
First, if (1 —a)(1j1j-)< r, then K =0.
8Second, if (1 — > r —a(2
—)],then K' => 0.
Third, if —a(2
—>r, then K =k>K.
In all three cases, K' is sufficiently large to induce indigenous families to choose .8=0.
In sum, K' is positive —thatis, colonial investment is profitable —eitherif a >9
and l—a>r orif O￿a and (1_a)(i j)°'r. With a>9, thewageshare
is high enough relative to the effectiveness of time allocated to extralegal appropriative
activities that, regardless of the amount of investment, indigenous families allocate no time
to extralegal appropriation. Nevertheless, for colonial investment to be profitable, neither
a nor the cost of capital, r, can be too large.
In contrast, with Sa, in order for indigenous families to choose to allocate no
time to extralegal appropriation, investment in the colony must be large enough to make
the wage rate higher than the marginal return to extralegal appropriation. As we have
seen, a decision to create a colony would always imply at least this amount of investment.
Nevertheless, for colonial investment to be profitable, neither C nor r can be too large.
If K' is positive, then K is proportionate to N and is decreasing in a.
Moreover, if K' equals K, then K' is decreasing in r but is independent of 9.
Alternatively, if .K equals K, then K' is independent of r but is increasing in 8. In
this situation an increase in the effectiveness of time allocated to appropriative activities
causes an increase in amount of investment necessary to induce indigenous families to
allocate no time to appropriative activities. Thus, although for too large values of 8 the
metropolitan government does not create a colony, for intermediate values of 9 a larger
& causes more investment in the colony.
With K =0,the net profits of the colonial sector, lvi are zero and the income
of each indigenous family, i, equals unity. But, with K' =K,M is positive and i is
larger than unity. Thus, a decrease either in 9 or in r that makes colonial investment
profitable benefits both the colonial firms and the indigenous families.
It is also easy to show that with K' =K,M is a decreasing function of S and
9i is an increasing function of 9. In this situation an increase in the effectiveness of time
allocated to extralegal appropriative activities requires an increase in investment in order
to induce the average indigenous family to allocate no time to extralegal appropriation.
Because, with K' =K,K' is larger than K, this increase in investment reduces net
profits. Moreover, because the increase in investment raises the wage rate, it increases the
income of the average indigenous family.
The Decision to Abandon a Colony
Suppose that the amount of investment that maximizes net profits is in place in
the colony. Now, suppose that there is an unexpected parametric change. To takean
interesting example, consider an exogenous and unexpected increase in the effectiveness of
time allocated to extralegal appropriative activities. Specifically, assume that 9 increases
from 9 to 9.
Let K' denote the amount of investment that maximized M given 9 =9and let
K denote the amount of investment that would maximize M with 9 =9.In addition,
let K0 denote the value of K given 9 =9oand let K1 denote the value of K with
9 =Ui, whereK1 >Kr,.Recall that K does not depend on 9. In analyzing the effect
of this unexpected increase in 9, there are three main cases to consider.
i) Suppose that K' =K=K.In this case, K' equals K both before and after
the increase in 9. Case i arises if both 9o and 9 are small. Incase i, the increase
in 9 has no effect. Investment in the colony, resource allocation in the colony, the net
profits of the colonial sector, and the income of the representative indigenous family are
all unchanged.
ii) Suppose that either K' =orK' =Kand that K =K1.In this case,
K' equals either k or K0 before the increase in 9 but equals K1 after the increase
in 9. Case ii arises if 9 is larger than in case i, but is not too large. In case ii, because
K1 is larger than both k and KD, the increase in 9 causes an increase in investment
10in the colony. This increase in investment is just sufficient to keep B =0.
iii) Suppose that either K =kor K =i'but that K =0.In this case, K
equals either K or r0beforethe increase in 9 but equals zero after the increase in 9.
Case iii arises if 8 is larger than in case ii. In this situation, if repatriation were possible,
the colonial firms would repatriate their capital. But, with repatriation not possible, the
options of the metropolitan government are to increase investment in the colony to K, to
maintain the colony with amount of capital unchanged at K, or to abandon the colony.
With the amount of capital K in place, the alternative cost of this capital is zero.
Accordingly, the relevant maximand for the metropolitan govenment is now A'!, where
(21)
and where (1 —f3)Kris given by equation (7). Let k represent the value of K that
maximizes M, subject to K ￿ K, with K; predetermined. If the maximum value of
ii? is positive, then the metropolitan government sets K1 equal to k. Alternatively, if
the maximum value of M is not positive, then the metropolitan government abandons
the colony.6
Now suppose that O is such that (jt) > r. In this subcase, equation (21)
implies that, over the range K1 > K > ¶'-N, M is an increasing function of K.
Consequently, the metropolitan government chooses either to increase K to K, or to
abandon the colony.
Equation (21) also implies that, with K equal to K1, the value of M would be
- — O,—a1—8k a —
MK...,=(K1—1 9N)( 1—a —r(K,—K0),
where K1 =
ac—edN.Thus, if rK > ft —(1
—a)(l.±Ij1)a]Ki, acondition that
would obtain if K, is large and O is not too large, then MJK..Kl is positive and the
'If the metropolitan government abandons the colony, then an indigenous sovereign takes over the en-
forcement of property rights. Our analysis implicitly assumes that the best deal that existing colonial firms
could make with the new indigenous sovereign !Ould allow them zero net profits. In general, the correct
comparison is between the maximum value of M nd the net profits that colonial firms anticipate under
the new indigenous sovereign.
11metropolitan government chooses to increase K to K1. Otherwise, MIK.K, is not
positive, and the metropolitan government abandons the colony.
If the metropolitan government maintains the colony with K increased to K1,
then indigenous families continue to allocate no time to appropriative activities. But, the
increase in investment in response to the threat of extralegal appropriative activities cause
an increase in the wage rate and the income of the average indigenous family.
Now suppose, alternatively, that 9 is such that (-)" Cr. Inthis subcase,
equation (21) implies that, over the range K1 >K￿ K, M is a decreasing function of
K. Thus, the metropolitan government chooses either to keep K unchanged at K or
to abandon the colony.
Equation (21) also implies that, with IC equal to K, the value of M would be
81—a 1—8 an IK=K(Ko19N)( 81
Thus,if K >¶1j0N, acondition that also would obtain if K is large and 9 is not
too large, then ictIx=K;is positive and the metropolitan government chooses to maintain
the colony with K unchanged at K. Otherwise, MIx=x; is not positive and the
metropolitan government abandons the colony.
If the metropolitan government maintains the colony with K unchanged at
then the increase in 8 causes indigenous families to reallocate time from both wage
employment and self employment to appropriative activities. Accordingly, production
in the colony and the profits of the colonial sector net of extralegal appropriation are
decreased, but still positive, and the income of the average indigenous family is increased,
Summary
The theory sketched above provides us with a suggestive set of implications about
the economics of colonial investment. We have derived conditions that determine the
profitability of colonial investment and that suggest why historically some countries but
12not others became colonies. The technologies available forproduction in the colonial sector
and for extralegal appropriation of the profits of the colonialfirms determine whether or
not extralegal appropriation presents a potential obstacle toprofitable colonial investment.
If extralegal appropriation is not a potential problem, then colonialinvestment is profitable
as long as the profit share of output in the colonial sector is larger than theopportunity
cost of capital.
Alternatively, if extralegal appropriation is a potential problem, then colonialinvest-
ment is profitable only if the return to time allocated toextralegal appropriative activities
would not be too large. Moreover, if colonial investment isprofitable, then the optimal
amount of investment in the colony is sufficiently large to makewage employment more
attractive than extralegal appropriation.
The establishment of a colony raises the income of theindigenous population. Thus,
a decrease in the opportunity cost of capital or a decrease in the effectivenessof time
allocated to extralegal appropriative activities that makes colonialinvestment profitable
benefits the indigenous population as well as themetropolitan capitalists who invest in the
colony. (Of course, the policy of the metropolitan government ofrestricting the amount
of investment in the colony in order to maximize net profits results ina lower income for
the indjgenous population that would obtain under unrestricted internationalinvestment.)
But, if the opportunity cost of capital and the technologies of production andextralegal
appropriation are such that colonial investment is profitable, then increased effectiveness
of time allocated to extralegal appropriative activities wouldimply an unchanged or higher
income for the indigenous population. In other words, theindigenous population benefits
from better possibilities for extralegal appropriation unless thesepossibilities are so good
as to make colonial investment unprofitable.
We have also explored the possibility that a colony thatwas initially profitable can
become unprofitable, in which case the colony is abandoned. We focusedon the example
of an unexpected exogenous increase in the effectiveness of time allocatedto extralegal ap-
13propriative activities. Depending on initial conditions and the size of the innovation, such
a disturbance either can cause no change in investment in the colony, or can cause increase
investment in the colony to keep wage employment more attractive than extralegal appro-
priation, or can cause the metropolitan government to abandon the colony. Abandonment
occurs if the increase in the effectiveness of time allocated to extralegal appropriative
activities is large.
In addition, even if the colony remains viable, a moderate increase in the effectiveness
of time allocated to extralegal appropriative activities can result in an equilibrium in which
a positive amount of time is allocated to extralegal appropriation activities. This result
obtains if the cost of capital is too high to warrant increased investment, but the return
to capital already in place net of losses of extralegal appropriation remains positive. As
we have seen, when a colony is established, the amount of investment is large enoii.gh and
the resulting wage rate is high enough to deter extralegal .appropriative activities. But, if
there is a subsequent unexpected increase in the effectiveness of time allocated to extralegal
appropriative activities, then The metropolitan government and the colonial firms can find
themselves willing to tolerate permanent losses of profits to extralegal appropriation.
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